Contents*

• Demographics and a Brief Historical Perspective 1128

1. Basic Sexological Premises 1133
2. Religious, Ethnic, and Gender Factors Affecting Sexuality 1139
3. Knowledge and Education about Sexuality 1169
4. Autoerotic Behaviors and Patterns 1178
5. Interpersonal Heterosexual Behaviors 1180
6. Homoerotic, Homosexual, and Bisexual Behaviors 1209
7. Gender Diversity and Transgender Issues 1219
8. Significant Unconventional Sexual Behaviors 1228
9. Contraception, Abortion, and Population Planning 1250
10. Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS 1262
11. Sexual Dysfunctions, Counseling, and Therapies 1272
12. Sex Research and Advanced Professional Education 1281
13. Sexuality and American Popular Culture 1286
14. Concluding Remarks 1304
15. Epilogue: A Transcultural Inventory of Courtship and Mating, by John Money 1307
16. References and Suggested Readings 1310

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Demographics and a Brief Historical Perspective

ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR

A. Demographics

The United States is located in the southern part of the North American continent. Its mainland is south of Canada and north of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other Caribbean island nations. The North Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans border the mainland on the east and west. The United States is the third-largest country by size, after Russia and Canada, and by population, after China and India. In comparing landmass, the U.S. is about half the size of Russia, three-tenths the size of Africa, about half the size of South America, slightly larger than China, and about two and a half times the size of Western Europe. The state of Alaska lies off Canada’s northwestern border, and the islands of Hawaii are 2,090 miles (3,360 km) southwest of San Francisco in the North Pacific.

The mainland climate is mostly temperate, but it is tropical in Florida and Hawaii, arctic in Alaska, semiarid in the Great Plains west of the Mississippi River, and arid in the Great Basin of the southwest.

In July 2002, the United States had an estimated population of 280.5 million. (All data are from The World Factbook 2002 (CIA 2002) unless otherwise stated.)

B. A Brief Historical Perspective

Britain’s American colonies broke with the mother country in 1776 and were recognized as the new nation of the United States of America following the Treaty of Paris in 1783. During the 19th and 20th centuries, 37 new states were added to the original 13 as the nation expanded across the North American continent and acquired a number of overseas possessions: Cuba, the Panama Canal Zone, the Philippines, and Hawaii and Alaska. The two most traumatic experiences in the nation’s history were the Civil War (1861-1865) and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Buoyed by victories in World Wars I and II and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the U.S. remains the world’s most powerful nation. The economy has been marked by steady growth, low unemployment and inflation, and rapid advances in technology.

C. Demographic Challenges and a Sketch of
Diversity, Change, and Social Conflict

DAVID L. WEIS

Demographic Challenges

In one sense, great diversity is virtually guaranteed by the sheer size of the United States. The U.S.A. is a union of 50 participating states. It is one of the larger nations in the world, with the 48 contiguous states spanning more than 3,000 miles (4,800 km) across the North American continent, from its eastern shores on the Atlantic Ocean to its western shores on the Pacific Ocean, and more than 2,000 miles (3,200 km) from its northern border with Canada to its southern border with Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, the state of Alaska, itself a large landmass covering thousands of square miles in the northwest corner of North America, and the state of Hawaii, a collection of islands in the mid-Pacific Ocean, are part of the union.

The United States has a population of more than 280 million racially and ethnically heterogeneous people (Wilkinson 1987; CIA 2002). A majority, about 190 million are white descendants of immigrants from the European continent, with sizable groups from Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Germany, and Poland. The last decade of the 20th century marked a major shift in the ethnic balance of the U.S. Between 1990 and 2002, white Americans whose ancestors came from Europe dropped from 80.1% to 75.1%. African-Americans, most of whose ancestors were brought to North America as slaves before the 20th century, dropped from second to third place, from 12.1% to 12.3%. Hispanics moved from third place at 9.0% in 1990 to second place in 2002 at 12.5% (see Section 2B, Religious, Ethnic, and Gender Factors Affecting Sexuality, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Perspectives, U.S. Latinos and Sexual Health). Their ancestors emigrated from such places as Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, as well as other Central and South American nations. Hispanics represent the fastest-growing minority group in the U.S. There are also more than two million Native Americans—Eskimos, Aleuts, and those mistakenly at one time called Indians—whose ancestors have occupied North America for thousands of years, and whose residence within the boundaries of what is now the U.S.A. predates all of the other groups mentioned.

Another group experiencing rapid growth in recent decades is Asian-Americans; there are now more than three million residents of Asian heritage. Substantial populations of Japanese and Chinese immigrants have been in the U.S.A. since the 19th century. More recently, there has been an increase from such nations as India, Vietnam, Korea, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Finally, there are smaller groups of immigrants from virtually every nation, with growing numbers of Muslims in recent decades. The size of the various nonwhite minority groups has been increasing in the last 30 years, both in terms of real numbers and as a percentage of the total U.S. population (Wilkinson 1987; World Almanac 1993).

It is fair to conclude that the U.S.A. is generally a nation of former immigrants. Moreover, one continuing feature of American history has been the successive immigration of different groups at different points in time (Wells 1985).

Approximately two thirds of the population lives within 100 miles (160 km) of one of the coastal shorelines. Most of the largest metropolitan areas lie within these coastal areas, and it is worth noting that most sexologists in the U.S.A. also reside in these same areas.

The United States is somewhat unique among the world’s economies in that it is simultaneously one of the largest agricultural producers, as well as one of the largest industrialized nations, exporting manufactured goods and technology to the rest of the world. Historically, the northeast and upper midwest have been the principal industrial centers, and the southeast and the central Great Plains have been the agricultural centers.

One of the economically richest nations in the world, America, nevertheless, has an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 individuals and 125,000 to 150,000 families homeless on any night. Overall, 15% of Americans—30% of the poor—are without health insurance. Infant-mortality rates and life-expectancy rates vary widely, depending on socioeconomic status and residence in urban, suburban, or rural settings. Fifty-two million American married couples are paralleled by 2.8 million unmarried households and close to 8 million single-parent families.

In summarizing aspects of sexuality in America, it is helpful to keep in mind that the United States of the 21st century will look profoundly different from the nation described in this chapter. Four major trends for the future have been detailed in Population Profile of the United States (1995), published by the U.S. Census Bureau.

There is also great diversity in religious affiliation in the United States (Marciano 1987; see Section 2A). To a considerable degree, the choice of religious denomination is directly related to the ethnic patterns previously described. The overwhelming majority of Americans represent the Judeo-Christian heritage, but that statement is potentially misleading. Within the Judeo-Christian heritage, there are substantial populations of Roman Catholics, mainstream Protestants (Lutheran, Methodist, Baptist, Episcopalian, and others), and a growing number of fundamentalist Christians. There is no great uniformity in religious practice or sexual mores shared by these various groups. In addition, there is a relatively small percentage of Americans who are Jewish and range from ultra-orthodox to conservative, reformed, and liberal. In recent decades, as immigration from Asia has increased, there has been a corresponding growth in the Muslim and Hindu faiths.

Several trends related to the practice of religion in the U.S.A. have become a source of recent social concern. These trends include: the declining attendance at the traditional Protestant and Catholic churches in what has been labeled the growing “secularization” of American culture; the “religious revivalism” reflected by the growth of fundamentalist churches; the growth of religious cults (e.g., Hare Krishna and the Unification Church); the growing power of the conservative Christian Coalition; and the emergence of the “Electronic Church” (religious broadcasting) (Marciano 1987). Throughout the history of this nation, diversity of religious beliefs and the separation of church and state have been central elements in conflicts over sexual morality.

The subcultures and peoples of the United States are as varied, diverse, and complex as any other large nation. The unique feature of sexuality in the United States is that we have far more information and data on American sexual attitudes, values, and behaviors than is available for any other country.

A Sketch of Recent Diversity, Change, and Social Conflict

A few examples will illustrate some of the issues that have been affected by this complex of influences.

[Update 1998: The dominant news story in the U.S. through much of 1998 concerned the alleged extramarital sexual practices of President Bill Clinton. Stories about Clinton’s sexual experiences with a number of women routinely surfaced throughout his presidential term. Certainly, no American president has ever been subjected to as much speculation about extramarital sex while still in office. As early as his first presidential campaign in 1992, Gennifer Flowers alleged that she had had a long-term affair with Clinton while he had been governor of Arkansas. Clinton initially denied her specific allegations. He did admit in a televised interview that he had had extramarital experiences, claiming that he and his wife had resolved their marital problems. Later, after his election, he admitted to an affair with Flowers. In 1994, Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, revealed at a press conference sponsored by a fundamentalist Christian group that she believed Clinton had sexually harassed her in 1991 while he was governor. Later that year, Jones filed a civil suit charging the President with sexual harassment. Jones claimed that Clinton invited her to his hotel room (using a state trooper as an intermediary), exposed himself, and asked her to perform fellatio (Isikoff & Thomas 1997; Taylor 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 1997 that the suit could proceed while Clinton was still in office (Isikoff & Thomas 1997).

[Enter Kenneth Starr. Starr, a Republican judge, had been appointed as a special prosecutor early in the Clinton presidency to investigate possible improprieties in an Arkansas business deal involving the Clintons that had come to be known as the Whitewater investigation. By November 1996, having spent three years and roughly $30 million and failing to generate credible evidence of wrongdoing by the Clintons, Starr’s investigators began questioning women who may have had sexual encounters with Clinton (Isikoff & Fineman 1997). With the Supreme Court ruling that the Jones lawsuit could proceed, Jones’s lawyers also began a search for women who could testify that they had been approached by the President while working for him. Members of the American press followed leads along the same lines. By early 1997, these separate lines of inquiry led all three groups to Linda Tripp, Monica Lewinsky, and Kathleen Willey.

[Kathleen Willey, a former volunteer in the White House social office, was initially called to testify in the Jones case. She made charges that Clinton had kissed and fondled her in the White House Oval Office in 1993 when she met with him there seeking a full-time job. Upon leaving Clinton’s office, Willey saw Linda Tripp in the hallway. According to Tripp’s affidavit, Willey had left that meeting looking disheveled and told her that the President had made sexual overtures toward her. Clinton’s attorney, Robert Bennett, called the charges a lie and attacked Tripp (Fineman & Breslau 1998; Isikoff & Thomas 1998). Tripp claimed that Willey had been pleased and “joyful” about the experience. Willey later claimed that she was distraught and upset by the incident. However, a friend of Willey’s claimed that Willey had instructed her to lie about being distraught over the incident. According to the friend, Willey had not been upset (Isikoff 1997). The Willey allegations did not become public until a 60 Minutes television interview in March 1998. Clinton denied the charges.

[In January 1998, President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky each signed affidavits in the Paula Jones case that they had never had sexual relations with each other. However, throughout 1997, Lewinsky had told a friend of hers on numerous occasions that she had been having an affair with the President. The friend was Linda Tripp. Believing that she would be called to testify about what Lewinsky had told her and fearing that she would be attacked by Clinton’s defense team, Tripp began taping her phone calls with Lewinsky. A week after the Lewinsky affidavit denying any sexual involvement with Clinton, Tripp approached Kenneth Starr’s investigators with her story. They proceeded to wire her for subsequent conversations with Monica Lewinsky. Roughly a week later, the story hit the headlines that Clinton may have had an affair with Lewinsky, that he may have perjured himself in the Jones case by denying it, that there was taped evidence of Lewinsky telling a friend about the affair, and that Clinton and his associates may have obstructed justice by urging Lewinsky to lie under oath (Fineman & Breslau 1998; Isikoff & Thomas 1998). There seemed to be little else in the news besides this ongoing saga.

[As we went to press, it was not yet clear how these allegations would turn out. On April 1, 1998, the suit by Paula Jones was thrown out of court. The federal judge in the case ruled that Clinton had not committed a crime of either sexual assault or sexual harassment, even if Jones’s claims were factual. Two thirds of American adults had indicated months earlier that they did not believe the Jones incident constituted sexual harassment (Isikoff & Thomas 1997).

[In an ironic twist, President Clinton’s approval ratings increased to their highest levels ever in the months after the Lewinsky story became national news. There was considerable speculation in the press about what this meant. It seemed clear that the majority of the American public did not want to see Clinton removed from office for the charges that had surfaced thus far. Many interpreted the polls as indicating that most Americans believed that a person’s sex life—even the President’s—is a private matter and should not be subjected to public investigation, unless it was specifically criminal itself. The message from the American public seemed to be, “Stay out of our bedrooms.”

[Another ironic consequence of these collected stories was that, at least for the time being, discourse about sexuality had never been freer or more open. Americans in general and the American media routinely discussed the President’s sex life, extramarital sex, oral sex, and the like. As a culture, we seemed to be talking about sex more than ever. (End of update by D. L. Weis)]

[Update 2003: As we went to press in 1998 with Sexuality in America, the single volume of the U.S. chapter taken from volume 3 of The International Encyclopedia of Sexuality, it was not yet clear how the allegations about President Clinton having sex with Monica Lewinski and other women would fall out. At first, Clinton denied those charges, waggling his finger at television cameras as he claimed that he had never had sex with “that woman.” Of course, we know now that Clinton and Lewinsky did have oral sex together (apparently, she performed oral sex on him, but he did not return the favor). The U.S. House of Representatives voted—in an overwhelmingly partisan display—to impeach him, and the U.S. Senate ultimately voted not to convict Mr. Clinton. The entire episode left many Americans and people around the world wondering what this all meant. Our concern here is with what it tells us about American sexuality and our themes of change, conflict, and diversity.

[First, we should mention that at no point did a majority of American citizens favor ousting Mr. Clinton from office over this affair. Roughly two thirds of the American public continued to support his presidency. The Republican party pursued impeachment on the assumption that, when Americans finally learned what Mr. Clinton had done, they would want him removed from office. That never happened. Roughly one third did respond that way, but only one third. In fact, numerous polls indicated that a majority of Americans were more likely to condemn Congress for impeaching Clinton than to have believed that he should be removed from office (Schell 1999). Social disapproval was the punishment for those who were seen as trying to get Clinton. Popularity ratings for Congress, Linda Tripp, and Ken Starr sank below 10% (Leland 1998/1999). Most social observers believed that this represented a shift from what would have occurred in the past, say if the extramarital sexual adventures of Presidents Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Franklin Roosevelt had become widely known. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that this is what allowed him to finish his term in office.

[A second consequence of the Bill Clinton sex scandal would be that sexual discourse is now even more open in America. According to John Leland (1998/1999), this open discourse about sex, including the Clinton scandal, oral sex, Viagra, and so on, is the principal distinguishing characteristic of the present culture. To this, we can add that the episode has made social conservatives even more determined to reverse what they see as the moral decay of American society.

[Third, there is the issue of what we might call the Bill Clinton definition of sex, stemming from his frequently re-shown claim that he had not had sex with Monica Lewinsky. There are now several studies of what Americans think “sex” is. Sanders and Reinisch (1999) asked 599 midwestern college students in 1991 if they believed that various acts constituted “having sex.” Roughly 60% indicated that they believed engaging in oral sex did not constitute having sex. In addition, nearly 20% indicated that anal sex was also not having sex. By the way, the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association was fired shortly after publishing this study (Cowley & Springen 1999). Hawkins and a research group (2002) completed a study of 311 7th- to 12th-grade students in rural Arkansas (Clinton’s home state). The students were asked to indicate what the words “abstinent” and “sexual activity” mean. The responses demonstrate a general lack of consensus about what these terms mean. Many of these young people, but not all, believed sex is intercourse. Similarly, abstinence was widely seen as abstaining from intercourse. Remez (2000) reported that “many” adolescents engage in oral sex without having intercourse and that “many” do not regard this as sexual activity. This view is also common in the Baptist (which Clinton is) tradition. One Baptist minister described the behavior as disgusting, but insisted that it did not constitute having sex (Woodward 1998). Thus, many Americans do, in fact, appear to share the view that oral sex is not having sex. Clearly, there is great opportunity for sex education in America—even today.

[Finally, we would like to note that the 2000 presidential election in the U.S.A. also demonstrates our general themes of change, conflict, and diversity. The polls from 1998 through 2000 strongly suggest that Mr. Clinton would have been re-elected if he could have run. True, those same polls indicate that one third of Americans would have bitterly opposed him. The actual election results, with Gore and Bush drawing almost exactly 50% of the vote, demonstrates that the cultural war between competing factions (which we discuss throughout this American chapter) is about as great as it has ever been. This has played out as a regular theme of the George W. Bush administration.

[There were, of course, other examples of change, conflict, and diversity besides the Clinton affair, which we mentioned in Sexuality in America in 1998 and our original chapter in 1997. (End of update by D. L. Weis)]

[Update 2003: A few fairly obvious events in the news since 1998 are worth mentioning here to bring our central theme of change, conflict, and diversity up to the present.

Each of the above events in the late 1990s and early 21st century serves as an intriguing indicator of the state of sexuality in the United States, and each also reveals much about the interaction of politics and sexual issues as we approached the end of the 20th century. They demonstrate that, despite the immense social changes that have occurred during the 20th century, strong elements of religious fundamentalism and conservatism remain active within the culture. In fact, a full explanation of sexuality in the United States requires an understanding of the diverse sexual, social, and political ideologies characterizing the culture and the ongoing conflict between various groups over those ideologies.

In this respect, there is a rather schizophrenic character to sexuality in the United States. On the one hand, the U.S.A. is a country with a multibillion-dollar-a-year erotica/pornography business; a mass-media system where movies, television, books, magazines, and popular music are saturated with sexually titillating content alongside serious educational material; a high rate of premarital sex (nearly 90% by the 1990s); one of the most active and open gay-rights movements in the world; and a continuing public fascination with unusual sexual practices, extramarital sex, and gender-orientation issues, including, most recently, bisexuality.

On the other hand, federal, state, and local governments have invested heavily in recent years in prosecuting businesses for obscenity, allowed discriminatory practices based on sexual orientation, largely failed to implement comprehensive sexuality-education programs in the schools, and refused to support accessibility to contraceptives for adolescents. The consequences of these failures include one of the highest teenage-pregnancy and abortion rates in the world and increasing incidents of gay-bashing that reflect the prevalence of homonegative and homophobic attitudes in the U.S.A.

These examples illustrate one of the major themes in this chapter: the changing nature of sexuality in the U.S.A. throughout the 20th century. Although accounts of changing sexual norms and practices are frequently portrayed as occurring in a linear process, we would suggest that the more-typical pattern is one reflected by ongoing conflicts between competing groups over sexual ideology and practice. Each of the examples cited is an illustration of how those conflicts are currently manifested in the social and political arenas in the U.S.A.

A focus on the conflict between groups with contrasting ideologies and agendas over sexual issues will be a second theme of this chapter. This process of changing sexual attitudes, practices, and policies in an atmosphere that approaches “civil war” is a reflection of the tremendous diversity within American culture. In many respects, the widespread conflict over sexual issues is a direct outcome of the diversity of groups holding a vested interest in the outcomes of these conflicts, with some groups seeking to impose their beliefs on everyone.

The diversity of these groups will be the third major theme of the chapter. One example that will be apparent throughout this chapter is the question of gender. There is growing evidence that men and women in the U.S.A. tend to hold different sexual attitudes and ideologies, to exhibit different patterns of sexual behavior, and to pursue different sexual lifestyles—frequently at odds with each other (Oliver & Hyde 1993). In some ways, it may even be useful to view male and female perspectives as stemming from distinct gender cultures. In reviewing sexuality in the U.S.A., we will frequently attempt to assess how change occurs in a context of conflict between diverse social groups.

1. Basic Sexological Premises

DAVID L. WEIS

This overall theme of social change occurring in a process of conflict between diverse groups is woven throughout the history of the United States itself. There are at least two ways in which a study of history is important to an understanding of contemporary sexological premises and sexual patterns in the U.S.A. First, there is a specific history of sexual norms and customs changing over time. To the extent that sexual attitudes and practices are shared by the members of a social group or population in a particular time period, they can be viewed as social institutions. Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult to describe such sexual institutions in the U.S.A. prior to the 20th century, because there are few reliable empirical datasets available for that period. To a large extent, we have to rely on records of what people said about their own or others’ sexual attitudes and practices, and such statements may be suspect. Still, it seems reasonable to suggest that current sexual norms and customs have been shaped, at least in part, by earlier patterns.

In addition, there is a second way in which the general social history of the U.S.A. is important to understanding changing sexual institutions. Sexuality, like other social institutions, does not operate in a vacuum. It is related to and influenced by other social institutions, such as the economy, government, marriage and the family, religion, and education, as well as social patterns such as age distributions and gender ratios. As we will discuss in Section 2, Religious, Ethnic, and Gender Factors Affecting Sexuality, a good deal of research evidence indicates that such social institutions are often related to various sexual variables. Researchers have not consistently tested these associations, but the point is a crucial one theoretically for explaining the dynamics of sexual processes in a culture as large and diverse as the U.S.A.

A. From Colonial Times to the Industrial Revolution

In 1776, at the time of the War for American Independence, the U.S.A. became a nation of 13 states located along the shore of the Atlantic Ocean. Most of the inhabitants of the former British colonies were of English descent, and they tended to be Protestant. Although the first Africans had been brought to America as indentured servants as early as 1620, the practice of slavery quickly evolved. By the time of independence, an active slave trade involving hundreds of thousands of Africans and Caribbeans was well established. Of course, the Africans and Caribbeans brought their own customs with them, although they were frequently prevented from practicing them. West of the 13 original states, the remainder of the North American continent within the area now constituting the nation was inhabited by several million Native Americans representing hundreds of tribes, each with its own set of customs.

At its birth, the U.S.A. was essentially an agrarian society. More than 90% of the population were farmers. There were few cities with as many as 5,000 residents. Boston was the largest city with 16,000, and New York was the second largest with 13,000 (Reiss 1980). The Industrial Revolution had yet to begin. Few men, and virtually no women, were employed outside the family home. Although it has become common to think of the 20th-century pattern of role specialization, with the man serving as the family provider and the woman as the housekeeper and childcare provider, as the traditional American pattern, it did not characterize this early-American agrarian family. Family tasks tended to be performed out of necessity, with both men and women making direct and important contributions to the economic welfare of their families. Sexual norms and practices in early America arose in this social context.

The images of early-American sexuality in folklore are those of antihedonistic Puritanism and sexually repressed Victorianism. In popular culture, these terms have come to be associated with sexual prudishness. This view is oversimplistic and potentially misleading. Recent scholars (D’Emilio & Freedman 1988; Robinson 1976; Seidman 1991) tend to agree that sexuality was valued by the 18th-century Puritans and 19th-century Victorians within the context of marriage. To the Puritans, marriage was viewed as a spiritual union, and one that tended to emphasize the duties associated with commitment to that union. Marriage involved mutual affection and respect, and the couple was viewed as a primary social unit. Spouses were expected to fulfill reciprocal duties. One of these was sexual expression. No marriage was considered complete unless it was consummated sexually. The Puritans accepted erotic pleasure, as long as it promoted the mutual comfort and affection of the conjugal pair. The reciprocal duties of marital sexuality were justified, because they were seen as preventing individuals from becoming preoccupied with carnal desires and the temptation to practice improper sex outside of marriage (Seidman 1991). Of course, one of the principal functions of marital sex was reproduction. Pleasure alone did not justify sexual union. Instead, the regulation of sexual behavior reinforced the primacy of marital reproductive sex and the need for children (D’Emilio & Freedman 1988).

Within this context, it is certainly true that the early English settlers tried to regulate nonmarital forms of sexual expression. However, even this point can be exaggerated. Reiss (1980) has noted that Americans have always had a courtship system where individuals were free to select partners of their own choice. To some extent, this may have been because of necessities imposed by immigration to frontier territories, but it also was a consequence of the freedom settlers had from the institutions of social control found in Europe. Elsewhere, Reiss (1960, 1967) has maintained that such autonomy in courtship is associated with greater premarital sexual permissiveness.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the settlers in New England developed the practice of bundling as a form of courtship. In colonial New England, settlers faced harsh winters. They commonly faced fuel shortages, and mechanized transportation forms had yet to be developed. Single men would travel miles to visit the home of an eligible female. Typically, they would spend the night before returning home the next day. Few New England homes of the period had multiple rooms for housing a guest, and few could heat the house for an entire 24-hour day. At night, the woman’s family would bundle the man and the woman separately in blankets, and they would spend the night together talking to each other as they shared the same bed. It is worth noting that the practice of bundling was restricted to winters. Reiss (1980) has argued that the implicit understanding that the couple would avoid a sexual encounter was not always honored. In fact, a study of marriages in Groton, Massachusetts, from 1761 to 1775 found that one third of the women were pregnant at the time of their weddings (cited in Reiss 1980). This system was acceptable because betrothals were rarely broken at the time and because it served to produce the marital unions the Puritans valued so highly. Eventually, bundling was replaced by visits in the sitting parlors of 19th-century homes and by the practice of dating outside parental supervision in the 20th century (Reiss 1980).

Around 1800, the Industrial Revolution began changing this world, albeit gradually. In the two centuries since, virtually every aspect of American life has been transformed. The 19th century was marked by social turmoil, a frontier mentality open to radical change, and a resulting patchquilt of conflicting trends and values. Among the events that left their mark on American culture in the 19th century were the following:

Pankhurst and Houseknecht (1983) have identified five major trends that they maintain began to change and shape the modern institutions of marriage and the family in the 19th century and continued to have an impact on American culture in the 20th century. The author of this section suggests that they have had a similar influence on sexual institutions. These trends are:

We do not have the space to explore fully the impact of each of these trends. However, relevant effects would include increased lifespans, decreased maternal and infant mortality at childbirth, the development of effective contraceptives, the emergence of a consumer culture that allows families to purchase most of their goods and services, the creation of labor-saving household technologies, increased leisure time, the development of modern forms of transportation, especially automobiles and airplanes, an increasing divorce rate, the increasing entry of wives and mothers into the labor force, decreasing birthrates and family size, increasing rates of single-parent families and cohabitation, increasing percentages of adults living alone, and increasing proportions of married couples with no children currently living at home (Coontz 1992). Many of these changes have resulted in greater personal autonomy for individuals. As Reiss (1960, 1967) has argued, such autonomy may be a major factor underlying several changes in sexuality throughout American history.

It should be stressed that these changes have not necessarily been linear or consistent throughout the period of the Industrial Revolution. Many began to emerge in the 19th century but accelerated and became mainstream patterns only in the 20th century. For example, as late as 1900, a majority of Americans were still farmers. The 1920 census was the first to show a majority of the population living in towns and cities. By 1980, only 4% of Americans still lived on farms (Reiss 1980). Similarly, women began entering the labor force in the early 19th century. However, it was not until 1975 that one half of married women were employed. By 1990, 70% of married women between the ages of 25 and 44 were employed (Coontz 1992). Yet another example is provided by the divorce rate. It had been gradually increasing for decades. That rate doubled between 1965 and 1975, and for the first time, couples with children began divorcing in sizable numbers at that time (Coontz 1992; Reiss 1980; Seidman 1991).

Seidman (1991) has described the principal change in American sexuality during the 19th century as the “sexualization of love.” It could also be described as a shift to companionate marriage. Marriage came to be defined less as an institutional arrangement of reciprocal duties, and more as a personal relationship between the spouses. The modern concept of love as a form of companionship, intimacy, and sharing came to be seen as the primary justification for marriage. As this process continued, the erotic longings between the partners, and the sexual pleasures shared by them, became inseparable from the qualities that defined love and marriage. By the early part of the 20th century, the desires and pleasures associated with sex came to be seen as a chief motivation and sustaining force in love and marriage (Seidman 1991). This view has come to be so dominant in the contemporary U.S.A. that few Americans today can envision any other basis for marriage.

D’Emilio and Freedman (1988) have argued that what they call the liberal sexual ethic described in the previous paragraph has been the attempt to promote this view of the erotic as the peak experience of marriage while limiting its expression elsewhere. However, as this view became the dominant American sexual ideology of the 20th century, it also served to legitimate the erotic aspects of sexuality itself (Seidman 1991). Eventually, groups emerged which have sought to value sex for its inherent pleasure and expressive qualities, as well as for its value as a form of self-expression. In effect, as the view that sexual gratification was a critical part of happiness for married persons became the dominant sexual ideology of 20th-century America, then it was only a matter of time until some groups began to question how it could be restricted only to married persons (D’Emilio & Freedman 1988).

B. The 20th Century

The social turmoil and the pace of social change that marked the 19th century accelerated exponentially in the 20th century. American culture in the 20th century became increasingly complicated and changed by often-unanticipated developments in technology, communications, and medicine. Among the events that have been identified as significant in 20th-century United States are the following:

These and other events too numerous to list, let alone analyze here, both contributed to and reflect the tension between the two ideologies mentioned above—one viewing sex as legitimate only in marriage, but as a necessary component of marital happiness, and the other viewing sex as a valid and important experience in its own right. The attempt to reconcile them can be seen as an underlying dynamic for many sexual practices and changes in the 20th century. These broad-based trends include:

Reactions to these trends, and the continuing tension between the two major ideologies we have outlined above, lie at the very heart of the ongoing conflicts over sexual issues today. Robinson (1976) has characterized this conflict as a battle between 19th-century romanticism and what he calls sexual modernism. Romanticism affirmed the essential worth of the erotic, but only within the context of an intense interpersonal relationship transformed by a spiritual and physical union. Modernism reaffirms this romantic ideal, but also transforms it by acknowledging the value of “an innocent physical need” (p. 194). Although the modernist is glad to be rid of Victorian repression and anticipates the promise of a greater sexual freedom, there is a concomitant fear of a future of emotional emptiness.

Reiss (1981) has characterized this as a conflict between what he calls the traditional-romantic and modern-naturalistic ideologies. He maintains that this distinction can be used to explain current conflicts over such issues as abortion, gender roles and differences, pornography, definitions of sexual exploitation, concepts of sexual normality, and even accounts of sexual history itself. This perspective is useful in interpreting mass-media claims about sexuality in the U.S.A. Thus, Lyons (1983), reporting for The New York Times, proclaimed that the “sexual revolution” was over by the 1980s and that America was experiencing a return to traditional values and lifestyles. To support his argument, he claimed that there was a recent decrease in the number of sex partners and a shift away from indiscriminate, casual sexual behavior (Lyons 1983). In contrast, Walsh (1993), writing for Utne Reader, proclaimed that the 1990s have been characterized by a renewed sexual revolution (second-wavers), with pioneering new philosophies and techniques employing technology (latex, computer imaging, computer networks, virtual-reality sex, phone sex, cathode rays, and group safe sex) to achieve sensual pleasure in a safe way.

From 1970 to 1990, as these social processes continued, Americans witnessed: 1. a decrease in the marriage rate; 2. an increase in the divorce rate; 3. an increase in the birthrate for unmarried mothers (although the overall adolescent birthrate decreased); 4. an increase in single-parent families; and 5. an increase in married couples without children at home (Ahlburg & DeVita 1992).

[C. The 21st Century

[Sexuality and Terrorism in the United States

RAYMOND J. NOONAN

[Update 2003: On September 11, 2001, terrorists, in a spectacular, well-planned, and coordinated attack, struck the United States by flying hijacked jumbo jets into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., with another jet apparently bound for another Washington landmark being brought down in a field in western Pennsylvania. Although it has been minimally highlighted, sexuality factors may well have been among the root causes of the attack, and, it would appear, other terrorist activities worldwide. In addition, little has been written about the impact that these attacks, as well as the subsequent “war on terrorism” or the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, may have had on the sexuality of Americans in the aftermath. Indeed, using the human sexuality complex (Noonan 1998b) as a theoretical framework, i.e., looking at our sexuality as a complex ecological system in a holistic environment, one would surmise that these events, like other outside factors, such as economic, political, and other social factors, of necessity, have had—and would have to have—an impact. Certainly, they have triggered responses that will be felt in the sexual sphere, as well as other aspects of American life, as we advance through the 21st century.

[Terrorism is a relatively simple set of destructive behaviors with a complex set of motivations. The possibility that terrorism might be ultimately rooted in sexual motivations often receives a look of incredulous bemusement. Yet, it should be apparent that sexuality factors, including profoundly different views of the roles and essence of men and women and their relative power in personal relationships and society, the value of premarital virginity and its relationship to marriage as an economic institution benefiting the extended family versus marriage and relationships as expressions of love and personal autonomy, and the conflict in demarcating masculinity and femininity arising from same-sex relationships and the globalization of American popular culture, have the capacity to provide the fuel for the intensity of the clash between civilizations that has come to define international terrorism.

[These are especially salient when religion, with its precepts and notions of purity and impurity so deeply linked to sex and the dualistic split between the body and mind/spirit, is considered. It is easier to understand territorial, political, and economic motivations—or even ancient interethnic rivalries—whereas the religious motivations, such as the Islamic fundamentalism ascribed to the 9/11 terrorists, seem incongruous with the way most Americans view religion and the efforts needed to impose it and its sexual and gender ethic on everyone. The sole exception in the United States seems to be the Christian-fundamentalist anti-abortion terrorists who attack abortion clinics and sometimes kill clinic workers, albeit on a much smaller scale than the worldwide attacks of the Islamic extremists. Still, abortion terrorists have helped to restrict access to legal abortions in hospitals, as well as to providers in many U.S. states (Baird-Windle & Bader 2001). The difference between the two groups may signify a difference between the worldviews of the monolithic entity known as Western Civilization and some of the other non-Western cultures, which will be discussed later.

[Norman Doidge (2001), a research psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who teaches at Columbia University and the University of Toronto, summarized the various news reports that several of the September 11 terrorists had visited prostitutes and lap dancers in the days prior to the attacks and noted suggestions that various commentators have made about their possible motivation for frequently behaving in ways contrary to their expressed piousness: For example, they may have been using sex as an anxiety reliever prior to their suicide missions or as a confirmation of their belief that they were protecting Islam from the sexual licentiousness that they ascribed to Western cultures, in particular to that of the United States, which would then “justify” the murders in their own minds. In contrast, Doidge suggested that their behavior “reveals the ambivalent sexual undercurrent that is part of Islamic extremism with its view of woman as sin-evoking temptress, best appreciated either totally veiled, or totally unveiled.” In summarizing other terrorists with similar contradictions, he wrote further:

But fanatics throughout history have had a markedly hypocritical attitude toward sex. Most fanatical sects have an obsession with sexual purity, alongside extraordinary lapses of restraint. Most divide the world into the pure and the impure, the sacred and the profane, clean and unclean, pure ascetic man and female temptress. . . . Fanatical leaders frequently demand their members subordinate all desires to the cause. . . .
            Islamic extremism doesn’t master sexuality—it exploits it by linking it to politics. In order to train Islamic suicide bombers, teenage boys are isolated from television and any outside influence when they are at the height of their sexual drive, playing on the Koranic promise to “martyrs” that, within moments of their death, they will be greeted by the 72 houris of heaven—virgins with whom they will have sex for eternity. Sex in this earthly world is devalued, but the promise of sex in the world to come is used to heat up the imaginations of these isolated, inexperienced loners. . . .
            Such cults frustrate everyday erotic longing for other people, so that the devotees will turn that longing toward the cult leader and the cause. Becoming overheated “lovers of the cause,” they, like lovers everywhere, become willing to sacrifice for their beloved. At the same time, their leaders manipulate the guilt followers feel about sexual desire, saying, “If you still have sexual feelings, you obviously are not devoted enough, and must sacrifice more.”
            People who deny themselves erotic outlets soon see any normal expression of eros as the devil incarnate. . . .

[It is known that sexual activity can have an ameliorative effect on suicidal ideation and depression, preventing many suicides (Planned Parenthood Federation of America 2003). It may also have the same effect on some forms of violence. Individuals who have a positive attitude toward sex, per se, tend not to be terrorists. However, in wars of liberation, it is known that when they are successful, there often follows a period of unrestrained sexual activities, although it may not last if the leadership turns out to be generally repressive of sexuality, as occurred in Russia following the October 1917 Revolution, as noted in the chapter on Ukraine in this volume. This sexual freedom can be attributed to the fact that sexuality often symbolizes personal liberation for many people, particularly if they have lived under sexually repressive social systems.

[Suppression of the sexual impulse allows the power of sex to be subverted for destructive political ends, as in the case of current Muslim and Christian extremists, although it can be used for “positive” purposes, as the channeling of religious fervor for some clerics (cf. George Orwell’s 1984). Thus, combined with other factors, such as the fact that it has been almost a century since Muslim colonial aspirations, which peaked with the Ottoman Empire, were dismantled at the end of World War I, ending centuries of dominance and Arab Islamic control over vast areas of Europe, Africa, and Asia. Yet, little if anything is said about the fact that, like the European Christian colonialists of the past, the Arab Muslim colonialists of the past conquered many more lands, imposing Islam on the inhabitants. (This silence may be attributable to the anti-Western sentiments that are currently fashionable in some American circles, as well as often well-meaning efforts to promote multiculturalism and diversity.) Indeed, as noted by Wolfgang Giegerich (a Jungian psychologist, in Fraim 2002), Islam was once the leading intellectual force in the world, although it has had little to offer the world for centuries. This has resulted in a sense of inferiority and shame that few Westerners can feel, which may account for the level of desperation seen in the terrorist attacks here and abroad.

[In his essay, “Islamic Terrorism,” Giegerich (in Fraim 2002) has noted that, of the world’s great religions, Islam is the only one that does not have a significant tradition of self-reflection—one in which basic premises and human-behavioral imperatives are evaluated in light of social and other advances in civilization. In fact, Giegerich advances the theory that it is a temporal clash and not a clash of civilizations that exists, one in which Islamic thought is stuck in the Middle Ages. Thus, he believes the West must look to its own past to understand their anger in order to find solutions. Thus, one can readily imagine how sexuality factors, as very powerful modern images projected through American popular culture, are fueling the terrorists’ aggression (see the section on Sexuality and American Popular Culture at the end of this chapter).

[It is clear that one major factor in the sexual revolution in the West that has been increasingly adopted by younger people all over the world as they are exposed to Western ideals is the central importance of love and intimacy as a foundation for marriage and other sexual relationships. This is in sharp contrast to the centrality of marriage as an economic community and family institution, for example, in Islam today and most other religious traditions in both the East and West in the past if not still today. Thus, unsanctioned sexual relations threaten the power politics of traditional patriarchal societies, as younger people assume this aspect of control over their own lives.

[Another probable overlooked sex-related factor in terrorism is the Malthusian principle of population growth and its effects on the ecological psychosocial environment (Malthus 1798). Historically, programs aimed at increasing population growth have been promoted to fill the ranks of warriors, taxpayers, menial laborers, and religious adherents, to which, today, has been added consumer markets. This is in addition to the intrapsychological pressures some people feel to prove their masculinity or femininity to themselves and others by having babies.

[One of the most important sequelae of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. has been the reassertion both of male heroism and its closely allied cousin, the conservative political agenda. Much of this resurgence has as much to do with the traditional male role as protector—reinvigorated as a result of the attacks—as it probably has to do with the reaction to both the misandrist and heterophobic undercurrents that can be found in contemporary American culture, which are fueled largely by those who wish to exploit them for their own personal and political agendas on both the left and the right. Thus, we can probably expect to see a gender shift toward the expression of more-traditional masculine posturing, which has been clearly evident in the post-9/11 world in the United States. Indeed, much was made of the exaggerated images of President George W. Bush’s genital region (reminiscent of the codpieces used to enhance the “manhood” of the aristocracy in the 15th and 16th centuries), when he descended from the cockpit of a fighter jet and crossed the deck of an aircraft carrier after the war in Iraq (Goldstein 2003). Research is needed to ascertain the impact that these new gender realities will have on American sexuality.

[Effects of Terrorism and War on the Sexuality of Americans. It is well known that war can have a significant impact on birthrates in the immediate areas of armed conflict (declining during a war and increasing immediately following it), as noted by the authors on the chapters on Croatia and Israel in this volume, although research on the concomitant effects on sexual behavior, per se, are rare, if nonexistent. Certainly, the post-World War II baby boom has been partially attributed to the impact of men returning from military service. The impact of terrorist bombings, being that they are typically more sporadic and uncertain and are directed against civilian populations, is also likely to have had an effect where they have occurred as they have had in Israel. Similar effects of the tensions of the Cold War appear not to have had an effect, although it has been conjectured that the potential nuclear threat may have encouraged early sexual experimentation in the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, combined with the introduction of the oral contraceptive pill, following the stifling 1950s. Still, even unarmed conflict can have an impact on sexuality, as noted in the chapter on Russia in this volume, where, following the collapse of Communism and the ensuing severe economic crisis, the birth and marriage rates fell sharply, as well as life expectancies, and divorce rates increased. Even population migration caused by wars can result in cross-cultural conflicts in the new lands, often surrounding sexual issues, as noted in the chapter on Sweden in this volume. In addition, the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases can increase, as noted in the chapter on Ukraine. Indeed, even wide-area events like the historic blackout of August 2003 affecting New York and several other northeastern states and parts of Canada, suggesting vulnerabilities to less-violent forms of terrorism, brought reminiscences of increased birthrates following past regional blackouts.

[The heightened levels of security also can have an effect. There is a fine line between reasonable security procedures and the enhanced anxiety generated by exaggerated security measures. In addition to keeping vigilant about one’s surroundings, such measures keep gloom-and-doom scenarios fresh in people’s minds, with the enhanced anxiety that can have an impact on intimate relationships. To be sure, terrorist attacks remain a dangerous reality and probable source of anxiety in the U.S. and worldwide. Post-traumatic stress disorder has been documented in New York City, where it was the most prevalent following the terrorist attacks, as well as in the rest of the U.S. It is likely to continue for some time, given that political and business leaders appear committed to not rebuilding the Twin Towers (Noonan 2002). Certainly, the terrorists were more aware of the symbolic value of the Towers than our leaders are. Surely, also, the Malthusian effects noted above are part of the overemphasis being placed on 9/11 memorials at the World Trade Center site, which is also working against the restoration efforts, which could accelerate the healing process. Stress is well known to disrupt sexual functioning as well as creates other strains on intimate relationships.

[Comments about the new awareness of the importance of family and personal relationships, in contrast to work and other concerns, were made in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the United States. However, this was largely anecdotal, and may have amounted to a blip in actual practice that is beginning to shift again. Further research is needed to clarify these changes, although whether sufficient previous data are available for comparison is uncertain.

[Americans appear to be deeply ambivalent about the leadership role in world affairs it has had roughly since World War II. The September 11 attacks may, thus, signify a turning point in American world (and domestic) consciousness, with a retreat from leadership roles in any domain (clearly evident in the failure to recognize the symbolic importance of rebuilding the Twin Towers), with the possible exception of computer technology. And this failure to lead is reflected in some areas of the sexual arena as well, as can be seen throughout this chapter. The much-touted “American Century” of the 1900s (mostly the second half), may have been our historical apogee, with the ebb and flow of dominant nations and empires about to shift. The United States has certainly lost its illusion of moral authority in the eyes of much of the world (if not in the eyes of its own people), as fundamental corruptions in the legal, political, and economic systems become more apparent—this despite the fact that much of how these American systems operate more closely approach the ideals that free peoples value than those of many other countries. Sexuality factors—including ostensibly “liberal” attitudes and behaviors, are not the predominant reason for this decline in American moral authority, although it is cited as such by some critics, both inside and outside our country—further justifying oppressive political and sexual agendas that have yet to be seen.

[Terrorism and AIDS notwithstanding, we in the West, and Americans in particular, continue to live in a significantly less-risky era than our ancestors. As a result, women as well as men have enjoyed this relatively risk-free environment for decades, perhaps contributing to the increased devaluation of men because their traditional role as protector has been diminished. Yet, it appears that fanatical Islamic fundamentalists are intent on world domination, in a way similar to that for which fundamentalist Christians also strive. The early Arab Muslims seemed to be the Eastern equivalents of the Western colonialists of Europe. The contrast in methods of achieving it appears to be the difference between a series of conquests up to the Ottoman Empire, which fell after World War I, on the one hand, and the evangelical missionaries that have continued to thrive in many areas throughout the world. It remains to be seen to what extent the extensive out-migration of Islam to the West is, in effect, a silent evangelical push to reestablish the dominance of Islam, following the generally bloodless approach of the Christians, or is simply a search for religious freedom and the promise of a better life that is still America. In the meantime, Cherchez le sexe to determine the level of intensity with which terrorists will act to impose their visions on others. (End of update by R. J. Noonan)]

2. Religious, Ethnic, and Gender Factors Affecting Sexuality

Social scientists have demonstrated an association between human behavior and such social factors as religion, race, gender, social class, and education. This is as true of sexuality as of other forms of behavior. Although sexuality researchers have not always incorporated a recognition of this principle in their designs and analyses, there is still abundant evidence that sexual practices in the U.S.A. are strongly related to social factors. In this section, we examine several examples. First, we review the general influence of the Judeo-Christian heritage in the U.S.A. and describe the sexual culture of a particular religious group within this tradition, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons). Next, we see a brief discussion of reemerging spirituality-sexuality movements. Then we review the sexual customs of two of the largest minority groups in the U.S.A., African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans, followed by a look at Native American sexuality. Finally, we review the emergence of feminist ideology in the U.S.A., a view constructed around the concept of gender, which is contrasted with a look at emerging men’s perspectives on sex and gender and a review of the concept of heterophobia in American life. These reviews are by no means exhaustive or complete, but should serve to illustrate both the diversity of social groups within the U.S.A. and the influence that membership in such groups exerts on sexual customs and practices.

A. Source and Character of Religious Values

General Character and Ramifications of American
Religious Perspectives on Sexuality

ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR and TIMOTHY PERPER

Sexual science in America is a mid- to late-20th-century discipline. By contrast, Western religious thought about love, sexuality, marriage, the social and familial roles of men and women, and the emotions and behavioral patterns associated with courtship, pair bonding, conception, and birth have textual bases in the Jewish Pentatuch and other biblical writings. In pre-Christian Hellenic thought, the first great document of sexology is Plato’s Symposium (ca. 400 B.C.E.). Because Judaic and Hellenic thought have strongly influenced the sexual views of Christianity and all of Western culture, one must acknowledge that the theological, religious, and secular writings that permeate American conceptions of sexuality are embedded in this 3,500-year-old matrix that gives sexuality its place in life (and unique meanings). This section will explore the sources and character of religious values in the U.S.A. and their impact on sexual attitudes, behaviors, and policies.

Religious Groups in the U.S.A. Statistically, Americans are 61% Protestant—21% Baptist, 12% Methodist, 8% Lutheran, 4% Presbyterian, 3% Episcopalian, and 13% other Protestant groups, including the Church of Latter-Day Saints (see the second major subsection below for a more in-depth discussion of the sexual doctrines and practices of this religious group), Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Christian Scientists, and others. Roman and Eastern-rite Catholics account for 25% of Americans, Jews 2%, 5% other religious groups, and 7% are not affiliated with any church. Therefore, the two largest denominations in the U.S.A. are the Roman Catholic Church with a membership of over 50 million and Southern Baptist Conventions with between 10 and 15 million members (Greeley 1992). There are also 2.5 million Muslims in the U.S.A.

Because Americans tend to cluster geographically according to both their religious and ethnic heritages, local communities can be much more strongly affected by a small but highly concentrated religious or ethnic tradition than the above percentages might suggest at first sight. With recent public debate focusing on sexual morality (e.g., contraception, abortion, and homosexuality), a paradoxical realignment has occurred, with liberal Roman Catholics, mainstream Protestant churches, and liberal and reformed Jews lining up on one side of these issues, and conservative (Vatican) Roman Catholics, fundamentalist Protestants, including the televangelists and Southern Baptists, Orthodox Jews, and fundamentalist Muslims on the other side.

A Basic Conflict Between Two Worldviews. American religious institutions on the national level, their local religious communities, and individual members are caught in a pervasive tension between the security of traditional unchanging values and the imperative need to adapt perennial religious and moral values to a radically new and rapidly changing environment. This tension permeates every religious group in the United States today, threatening schism and religious “civil war” (Francoeur 1994).

At one end of the spectrum are fundamentalist, evangelical, charismatic factions that accept as word-for-word truth the writings of the Bible as the word of God, and advocate the establishment of the United States as a Christian nation. For them, living under God’s rule would be evidenced by the man firmly established as the head of each family in the U.S.A. and the woman in her God-given role as submissive wife and bearer of children for the Kingdom of Heaven. Similar fundamentalist strains in the United States are apparent among ultra-orthodox Jews and radical Muslims (LeHaye & LeHaye 1976; Marty & Appleby 1992, 1993, 1994; Penner & Penner 1981; Wheat & Wheat 1981). These embody an absolutist/natural law/fixed worldview.

On the conservative side, books about sexuality written by married couples dominate the market and sell millions of copies without ever being noticed by the mainstream publishing industry. Intended for Pleasure (Wheat & Wheat 1981) and The Gift of Sex (Penner & Penner 1981)—the latter couple having been trained by Masters and Johnson—provide detailed information on birth control and express deep appreciation of sex as a gift to be enjoyed in marriage. Tim and Beverly LeHaye’s The Act of Marriage celebrates marital sexual pleasure, but disapproves of homosexuality and some sexual fantasy. All books in this category stress mutual pleasuring and the importance of female enjoyment of marital sex.

At the other end of the spectrum are various mainstream Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims who accept a processual/evolutionary worldview (Fox 1983, 1988; Curran & McCormick 1993; Heyward 1989; Kosnick et al. 1977; Nelson 1978, 1983, 1992; Nelson & Longfellow 1994; Ranke-Heinemann 1990; Spong 1988; Thayer 1987; Timmerman 1986) rather than the fixed fundamentalist worldview. In this processual worldview, the sacred divinely revealed texts are respected as

the record of the response to the word of God addressed to the Church throughout centuries of changing social, historical, and cultural traditions. The Faithful responded with the realities of their particular situation, guided by the direction of previous revelation, but not captive to it. (Thayer et al. 1987)

The most creative and substantive analysis of the evolution and variations in biblical sexual ethics over time is William Countryman’s Dirt, Greed, and Sex: Sexual Ethics in the New Testament and Their Implications for Today. (For a full annotated list of sexuality texts, see Cornog & Perper 1995.)

The tension between the values and morals derived from fixed worldviews and those derived from processual worldviews is evident in official church debates about sexual morality and is also experienced by church members as they struggle to find their way through the confusion resulting from these two views. But it also affects the lives of secular Americans with no connection with a church, mosque, or synagogue, because the religious debate over sexual values permeates all levels of American society, and no one can escape the impact of this debate and conflict on politics, legislation, and social policies. Table 1 is an attempt to describe in a nondefinitive way the two divergent sets of values derived from the processual and fixed worldviews. Table 2 lists some religious traditions in both the fixed and processual worldviews in the major religions around the world.

Table 2                  

A Spectrum of Ethical Systems with Typical Adherents in
Different Religious Traditions

This table is an attempt to visualize the range of sexual moralities in different religious traditions and relate them in terms of their basic worldviews. There is often more agreement between different Jews, Protestants, and Catholics at one or the other end of the spectrum, than there is between Protestants, or Catholics, or Jews who disagree in their worldviews. Protestants in the covenant tradition, for instance, have more in common with liberal Catholics who disagree with the Vatican’s opposition to such practices as contraception, masturbation, premarital sex, abortion, divorce, and homosexuality, than they do with their fellow Protestants who are members of the fundamentalist Christian Coalition, Eagle Forum, or Focus on the Family.
Tradition Source	A Spectrum or Continuum
	Fixed Philosophy of Nature	Process Philosophy of Nature
Roman Catholic tradition	Act-oriented natural law/divine law order ethics expressed in formal Vatican pronouncements	A person-oriented, evolving ethics expressed by many contemporary theologians and the 1977 Catholic Theological Society of America study of human sexuality.
Protestant nominalism	Fundamentalism based on a literal interpretation of the Bible, as endorsed by the Moral Majority and the religious New Right: Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Church of Latter-Day Saints	An ethic based on the covenant announced between Jesus and humans—examples in the 1970 United Presbyterian workstudy document on Sexuality and the Human Community, Unitarian/ Universalists, and the Society of Friends (Quakers)
Humanism	Stoicism and epicurean asceticism	Situation ethics, e.g., the 1976 American Humanist Association’s “A New Bill of Sexual Rights and Responsibilities”
Judaism	Orthodox and Hasidic concern for strict observation of the Torah and Talmudic prescriptions	Liberal and reformed application of moral principles to today’s situations
Islam	Orthodox; observance of female seclusion (purdah) and wearing of the veil (chador); ritual purifications associated with sexual activities	Secular; more or less adoption of Western gender equality; flexible/lax observance of sex-associated purification rituals
While Eastern religions may, in some cases, fit in with this dualism of worldviews, the ascetic traditions of the East are positive traditions and lack the negativism towards sexuality that permeates the history of Christian asceticism and celibacy. Eastern asceticism is seen as a positive balance to the Eastern’s embrace of sexuality as both a natural pleasure to be greatly enjoyed and a path to the divine union. Also, the relationship with the dichotomous weltanschauungs evident in Western traditions needs to be explored and explicated.
Hinduism	Ascetic tradition of monks with world-denying sexual abstinence; yoga; ritual taboos and purification rites associated with sexual activities	Sacramental view of sex with worship of male lingam and female yoni; the Kama Sutra
Buddhism	Ascetic tradition of monks with sexual abstinence	Tantric traditions in which sexual relations are a path to divine union

Modern America is a ferment of discourse and debate concerning relationships between sexuality and religion. This occurs on the local and personal level among church members, as well as on the administrative level among the church leadership. The vast majority of